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Un algorithme efficace d’estimation du risque de contagion
Covid-19 à partir de mesures BLE-RSSI
Résumé : Ce rapport documente un algorithme de prédiction du risque de contamination
par le Covid-19 lors de situations de proximité physique en utilisant des mesures Bluetooth
(BLE-RSSI). Pour aboutir à un estimateur robuste du risque, l’algorithme proposé s’appuie sur
des propriétés connues de la physique de la propagation sans fil et sur les propriétés techniques
des interfaces BLE actuelles. L’algorithme proposé a été testé sur les données acquises par les
équipes allemandes de l’Institut Fraunhofer dans le cadre du projet européen PEPP-PT, que nous
remercions pour le partage des données ainsi que pour leur aide apportée via des commentaires
et réponses à nos questions.
Notre algorithme est actuellement en cours d’évaluation sur les données françaises acquises
entre le 18 et le 20 mai 2020.
Mots-clés : Covid-19, StopCovid, Bluetooth, BLE, prédiction de distance, prédiction de
propagation d’infection
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1 Introduction
Tracking how Covid-19 spreads over a population is a critical aspect that may aid relaxing
lockdown conditions. The European project PEPP-PT, and the French protocol ROBERT built
on it, both aim at using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) measurements obtained from HELLO
messages to estimate the risk of infection spreading from diagnosed individuals.
In this document, we develop an algorithm to improve the accuracy of risk estimation within
the structure and parameters of the ROBERT protocol. Underlying the algorithm is mathe-
matical modeling of the physical wireless communication link and experimental data based on
Bluetooth Received Signal Strength Indication (BLE RSSI) traces. In particular, the algorithm is
evaluated on experimental data obtained by the Bundeswehr experiments, which provide a large
number of device-to-device BLE RSSI traces in realistic scenarios. Descriptions of these sce-
narios have been provided by the working group Bluetooth Measurements and Proximity within
the PEPP-PT project [1, 2, 3, 4]. These documents include a general description of the project
which was delivered on April, 9, 2020 [5], and intermediate documents including reports on
measurements and descriptions of experimental data [1, 2, 3, 4].
In the solution proposed by the PEPP-PT project, a core element is a logistic regression
matrix used to predict a risk score from a small number of parameters acquired from a 15-minute
long RSSI vector; namely, the mean RSSI, max RSSI and the number of received packets. In
our approach—inspired by the data obtained in the PEPP-PT project—we propose a risk score
that relies directly on a physical interpretation of the experimental RSSI data by incorporating
pathloss and fading. We also adopt a Bayesian formulation of the risk estimation problem.
The document is organised as follows. First, Section 2 develops the proposed algorithmic
solution, to give a general overview of the solution. All parameters involved in the model will be
properly introduced and defined in the subsequent sections. Section 3 describes standard knowl-
edge on propagation facts. In Section 4 we describe a Bayesian model for distance estimation
from RSSI measurement. Exploiting PEPP-PT data from the Bundeswehr experiments, we also
tune the model parameters and evaluate the accuracy of the RSSI-distance relation. Section 5
derives a model of the probability of contamination, and shows how the RSSI measures can be
aggregated to compute a risk score.
2 Description of the proposed algorithm
In this section, we develop an algorithmic solution to compute an estimate of the infectiousness
risk, which has been developed upon the design of ROBERT algorithm used in the Stopcovid
application.
The proposed algorithm is first detailed and its integration at the different layers in the
Robert protocol is presented to provide a general and practical overview of the algorithm. Then,
the following sections detail the theoretical foundation and the experimental approach used to
develop this algorithm.
2.1 Assumptions and interactions with higher layers
The proposed algorithms involve three layers :
• The calibration function is hosted in the BLE physical layer.
• The risk scoring function is hosted in the application layer (on the mobile phone). Note
that according to Robert protocol, Risk scores are kept on the phone, unless the user is
tested positive.
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• The scores associated to the temporary received Ids are sent to the server by the mobile,
when the owner is declared infected.
• A user who wants to evaluate his risk, may decide to send the list of his former temporary
Ids to the server.
• The server then compares this list to the list of infected temporary Ids returned by infected
persons, and compute a global infectiousness risk. This risk is a multiple-contacts risk
measure and not a one-to-one risk evaluation.
This structure has been imposed for privacy reasons by the ROBERT protocol.
The objective of this document is to detail the process of converting a set of BLE RSSI
measurements into a final aggregated risk. The code of our application is spread over three
layers: the BLE-PHY calibration layer, the application layer and the server.
The BLE-PHY calibration layer interacts with the application layer, through the following
functions as illustrated in Fig.1:
• Start/stop function.
• Send data.
• Update (or initialize) parameters.
• Update software.
The main block in this layer is the Format_contact which gathers the packets received with
the same temporary Ids, and compensate the raw RSSI values by correction factors. This bloc
creates a contact which contains a temporary Id, a set of RSSI values and the corresponding
timestamps.
At the second layer, the application layer exploits these contacts by applying first the Filter_contact
function which suppresses the non significant contacts (duration of less than 5mn). It then com-
putes score vectors and a cumulative score associated to each contact. The final filter function
Filter_cum_score allows to select only the most significant contacts associated to the time
period.
2.2 System parameters
The following parameters are critical for the efficiency of the scoring function.
• Rate Rb(i): Each device which hosts the StopCovid application sends i HELLO packets
at a rate Rb(i). The nominal value of this rate is Rb(i) = 0.1Hz (i.e. one packet each 10
seconds, but the exact value may varies with the devices). As discussed in section 3.3, a
rate of at least 3 packets per minute is recommended. Note that a regular sampling is in
fact not necessary. The rate in average, should not be lower that 4 packets per minute
(0.066Hz). A higher rate, e.g. Rb(i) = 0.2Hz could provide a significant improvement on
the results, but at the price of an energy consumption increase and more packet collisions
in dense environments.
• Slots and synchronization: in order to preserve the privacy, the devices change their iden-
tifier (Id) every 15 minutes. The synchronization of the slots is granted by the application.
It is supposed here that the application is able to synchronize the devices and ensure that
the time shift between devices is below 1min. The slots are thus guaranteed to be at least
of 13min.
We denote Tsl the nominal time duration of slots.
Inria
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Figure 1: Representation of the proposed algorithm with the main processing
blocs : Filter_contact, Compute_score, Compute_cum_score, Filter_cum_score and
Aggregate_risk.
• Calibration : Gtx, Grx: It has been widely observed that RSSI values in BLE suffer from
a lack of calibration. The RSSI values may differ from more than 20dB (we shall refer the
reader to the work of the PEPP-PT group [2] or to [6, 7]. Therefore, a raw RSSI measure
should be understood as a non calibrated value that cannot be directly interpreted to mea-
sure neither the distance, nor the risk. A calibration is necessary, with two compensation
gains Gtx and Grx, to compensate respectively for the transmission gain/power and the
reception gain. Additional compensation can be applied.
– Static calibration: G0,tx, G0,rx Each device i possesses its own (static) calibration
values G0,tx(i) and G0,rx(i). In StopCovid, these values will be issued from the work
of the GSMA group, and are provided to the device when the application is installed.
These values can be later updated by the server, through the application. To avoid
confusion, the values of G0,tx(i) and G0,rx(i) in this document, are related to the
GSMA coefficient as follows
G0,tx(i) = −tx_RSS_correction_factor− ref_loss (1)
G0,rx(i) = −rx_RSS_correction_factor, (2)
where tx_RSS_correction_factor and rx_RSS_correction_factor are the GSMA
correction factors and ref_loss is the reference pathloss measured at one meter with
the reference phones in the GSMA procedure.
When a device i sends a HELLO packet with its temporary Id, it also sends a com-
pressed dynamic gain Gtx(i) that possibly combines the device specific static gain
G0,tx(i) with other dynamic calibration factors resulting from the environment.
In the algorithm V1, the received RSSI will be compensated only with these static
gains : Gtx(i) = G0,tx(i) and Grx(i) = G0,rx(i). Therefore, the receiver j will apply
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the two compensation values : Gtx(i) (sent by the transmitting device along with
its temporary Id Id(i,t), but without direct information on its actual identity i) and
Grx(j) (its own compensation value). The use of these values is described in the
algorithm below.
– Posture calibration: Besides device-specific static calibration gains, the RSSI values
are impacted by the current position of the device [7]: if the device (typically a
smartphone) is in the pocket rather than in the user hand, near the ear, we can expect
few dB less in the measured RSSI in both directions (emit and receive). Therefore
the sender and the receiver should modify their overall calibration gains according to
their postures. These corrections will be integrated if significant impact is confirmed
during our experimentation.
This requires to assume that the device is able to evaluate the posture (hand or
pocket) based on different sensors : screen on/off, light sensor, motion, ... This is
under investigation either from external information, or (partially) from dynamics of
RSSI time series.
Therefore, if a device is identified to be in a pocket, a gain of XdB can be applied
to the gains. The posture gain at the transmission and the reception is the same,
therefore an additional penalty Gpost(i) ∈ {0, X} could be updated every minute
from the posture evaluation routine.
The local Tx and Rx gains are updated accordingly :
Gtx(i) = G0,tx(i) +Gpost(i),
and
Grx(i) = G0,rx(i) +Gpost(i).
Note the the TX gain applied to the received RSSI is the gain received in the HELLO
packets.
– Environment calibration: This part is also optional. Based on environmental mea-
surements, mostly based on the density of HELLO packets, an environment density
parameter is estimated. A parameter, called crowded state: Scr ∈ [0, 1], is evaluated.
Then, an additional compensation gain Genv(i) can be introduced into Gtx(i) and
Grx(i) for each device :
Gtx(i) = G0,tx(i) +Gpost(i) +Genv(i),
and
Grx(i) = G0,rx(i) +Gpost(i) +Genv(i).
Overall, when both posture calibration and environment calibration are used, the emitter
first computes Gtx(i) as above and sends this value, along with its temporary Id. The
receiver uses this value together with its own value Grx(j) to obtain a calibrated RSSI
value as further described in the algorithm below.
• Risk scoring: the conversion of the calibrated RSSI values into a risk is detailed in sec-
tion 5. It is parameterized by a value r0, which relates the cumulative score coefficient
to a probability of infection. Considering HELLO packets received on device j (which
represents the "current device/receiver" on which the BLE and Application are run) from
a transmitting device with temporary Id Id, the objective is to estimate the conditional
probability P(Id is infected | j is infected). This is an estimate of the probability that the
Inria
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owner of the device with temporary Id Id becomes infected if we (later, through a positive
test) become aware that the owner of device j was actually infected during the considered
15min period of contact.
This probability is represented by a score πj,Id which is kept locally on device j. If the owner
of device j is tested positive and declares this event to the application layer by providing a
code obtained from a physician, and only in this case, then this triggers the transmission to
the server of the temporary Ids corresponding to scores above a certain threshold, together
with the corresponding scores. The threshold value (or no threshold) could be updated by
the server layer to adjust false positive / false negative tradeoffs. Moreover, the server can
adjust the value r0 which serves to translate scores to actual estimates of probabilities of
infection.
We propose the following options, where Q̂j,Id is a vector of calibrated RSSI values:
– A unique score: This score is the output of the Compute_cum_score function for each
15-minute period and each device Id Id met during this period, the cumulative score
πj,Id = R(Q̂j,Id) given by (45) is returned to the application after being filtered to
keep only the most significant contacts.
If the owner of device j declares itself as infected then this cumulative score is sent
to the server, and the probability P(Id is infected | j is infected) can be computed
given a parameter r0 that translates the score into a risk level. This is the version
intended to be used in algorithm V1.
– A more detailed metric with the following set of parameters (π̄jId, DjId, NjId) which
are respectively the average score (either with (53) or (55)), the duration of the contact
and the number of non null RSSI values (or higher than a threshold).
– Other options upon request are to send either the output of Compute_score or
Filter_contact to explore other risk computation. But the advantage of computing
the risk in the application is to account for local information, as mentioned earlier to
compensate for posture or environment.
Whatever the final choice the parameters to be sent to the server are named ΘjId.
Remark. When receiver j encounters transmitter i over different 15-minute periods, the
application layer (in device j) cannot accumulate the corresponding scores since the trans-
mitter’s Id changes from one period to another. However, if the receiver j is later tested
positive and sends to the server the list of Ids it has potentially infected, it will do so for
all of the Ids it has met (possibly restricted to the infectious period, and/or to scores above
a threshold). Then the final score will aggregate all scores. As discussed in section 6.0.3,
this allows compute the probability that the owner of device i is infected, P(i is infected),
by aggregating scores over possibly different Ids from the same user i, and over all different
j that have declared themselves as infected.
Remark. It could also be worth adapting the risk scoring to some posture or environmental
variables. For example, when a person is walking, the critical distance below which there is
a high risk of infection is considered to be of the order of dc ≈ 2m, while dc ≈ 10m when
the person cycling. Another example is that of healthcare personnel who are wearing high
quality protective equipment. Allowing them to declare this as a parameter would potentially
decrease the rate of false positives.
In order to simplify the implementation, we summarize in Table 1 the list of the parameters
to be taken into account.
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Name Role Procedure Nominal value
Rb HELLO Tx rate 1/10Hz
G0,tx Tx calibration Compensate_gain() see table GSM-A
G0,rx Rx calibration Compensate_gain() see table GSM-A
Gpost Posture calibration Compensate_gain() 0dB; (TBD)
Genv Environment calibration Compensate_gain() 0dB (TBD)
Dth Minimum significant duration Filter_contact() 2min
Twin Time window for aggregation Bufferize_RSSI() 120s
Toverlap Overlap between successive Bufferize_RSSI() 60s
time windows
Tref Reference duration for risk evaluation Aggregate_risk() 15min
r0 Risk coefficient Aggregate_risk() TBD
P ∗min Minimal significant RSSI Compute_score() −66dBm
∆P Power range Compute_score() {15, 20, 21, 23, 27, 39}
Table 1: List of parameters to be used in the application. The parameters indicated by not
necessary are used in the theoretical mode but do not need to be used in the implementation.
the parameters with the symbol .∗ are those for which the nominal values have been estimated
from the PEPP-PT datasets and used to compute the other parameters, but they are not used
explicitly in the algorithms.
2.3 General algorithm description
The implemented functions follow:
Compensate_gain() This function, according to the known compensation gains, should apply
the correction on the raw RSSI values:
QjId(n) = RSSIjId(n) +Grx(j) +Gtx(Id). (3)
where the correction gains have been defined above.
Bufferize_RSSI() The RSSIs and the corresponding timestamps, associated to a series of
HELLO packets sent by the same Id are bufferized and represent what we call a contact. These
contacts are sent to the application.
Filter_contact() This function suppresses contacts made of less than Dth. By default, Dth =
2min.
Compute_score This function computes for each contact, a scoring vector. Three sub-functions
are used :
• Clipping : RSSI values higher than RSSIth are clipped. Indeed, we observed some HELLO
packets with critically high RSSI values. However to keep this information, this RSSI value
is replaced by the min of its two adjacent RSSI values.
• Windowing : to compute a score as a function of time, a sliding window of length Twin is
used with an overlap Toverlap. Default values are 2min and 1min respectively.
Inria
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• Fading reduction : in each window, the mean power is computed according to (8) in section
3.3 where PjId[k], k ∈ (1, N) stand for the corrected RSSI values received in the current
window. The interest of this averaging in the linear domain relies on the fact that it
enhances the impact of high RSSI values, which are more relevant, than low values which
can be due to a long distance or to a deep fading. The output is the averaged RSSI P̂jId(k)
produced each minute during a slot of at most 15 minutes.
• Score computation : Taking a 15min vector of average RSSI values (in the nominal setup
we should have 15 values), the scores is computed according to the risk model described
in section 5. To be precise, from the vector of compensated and averaged RSSI values
Q̂jId = [Q̂jId(1), . . . , Q̂jId(K)], the risk parameters are computed.
Compute_cum_score This function computes a unique risk score according to (52).
Filter_cum_score This is an optional function which allows to keep at most Nmax contacts
per slot. Additional information such as the number of simultaneous contacts can be used for
further improvement of this filter.
Aggregate_risk As described in section 6.0.3, the probability of contamination aggregates all
cumulative scores according to (56) or (57). This function is hosted at the server.
3 Propagation model and parameters adjustment
In this section we first describe the main aspects of the propagation model which relates the
received powers to the emitted power and the distance, using various nuisance parameters. We
then discuss averaging techniques to reduce the effect of nuisance parameters such as fading and
shadowing, and experiments to assess the performance of these techniques.
3.1 Propagation model
The individual RSSI measures suffer from static errors, shadowing and fading.
The received power at a receiver j from a transmitter i is known to be governed by the
following law
Pji(t) = PE +GE +GR + L0 − L(dji) + Sji(t) + Fji(t), (4)
where Pji(t) and the emitted power PE are in dBm. The distance dji between transmitter
and receiver is in meters. The emitting gain ∆E , receiving gain ∆R (which will be respectively
compensated byGtx andGrx), the theoretical pathloss function L(·), and the theoretical reference
pathloss at one meter L0 = L(d = 1m) (which should be close to the experimental one, ref_loss,
cf (1)), are all in dB, as well as the shadowing offset Sji and the fading offset Fji. The time
dependence t indicates the quantities that are evolving with time.
Considering a reference distance dmax, in the absence of any shadowing or fading, the asso-
ciated theoretical uncompensated received power is
P (dmax) := PE +GE +GR + L0 − L(dmax), (5)
and we can rewrite the actually received uncompensated received power through the following
form
Pji(t) = P (dmax) + L(dmax)− L(dji) + Sji(t) + Fji(t).
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The pathloss function L(dji) is modeled with the very usual model [8] as






where n is the pathloss slope coefficient. Then, a relative pathloss can be defined as:






leading to the reference equation describing the uncompensated received power as:
Pji(t) = P (dmax)− Lr(dji) + Sji(t) + Fji(t). (7)
In this document, and for the model, we will use dmax = 5m. The values of the pathloss slope n
and of the theoretical uncompensated received power P (dmax) are critical modeling values that
can only be estimated from real data and for a given pair of devices. However, knowing the
compensation gains allows to apply the same model to other devices.
In a real environment, the received power suffers from two additional offsets: shadowing Sji
and fading Fji effects. Although both effects are related to the complexity of the environment,
and to multipath propagation, they characterize two different phenomena. The shadowing, also
called slow fading represents the randomness introduced by obstacles and surrounding reflections
due to human bodies, walls, furniture [9, 10, 11]. It is called slow fading because its effect is rather
static and evolves only if people move significantly. Therefore, in the target application, here, for
one estimation of several minutes this shadowing variable is constant and introduces a strong bias
on the average power received during one observed slot. This shadowing effect usually behaves
like a Gaussian random variable of zero mean. Its standard deviation is a critical parameter of
the model and represents the shadowing strength. We denote it σSh. Typically, the better the
calibration process, the smaller the shadowing strength.
The fading Fji refers to so-called fast fading. Typically it introduces a random effect due
to the random summation of multipaths [12]. It varies very quickly, and at the acquisition rate
we are concerned with (about 1Hz), we can consider that each RSSI measure provides a new
realization of this fading parameter. This random variable in the linear domain usually follows
an exponential law, or more generally a Nakagami-m law. Due to fading, a one shot RSSI value
may suffer from deep fading such as a loss of more than 20dB! This is why it appears critical to
suppress the fading effect by applying an averaging over multiple RSSI measures.
3.2 Fading reduction
The fading Fji(t) is due to multipath propagation and induces fast power variations. Typically,
the received power (at a rate below Rb <= 1Hz) is corrupted by a strong fading. The analysis
of real traces shows that the probability distribution of the fading effect is close to a Rayleigh
fading in almost all scenarios. According to [13] and other references, the worst situation comes
when the fading is Rayleigh, i.e. the received power follows an exponential distribution. If the
shadowing is constant over the observations, the power variations are only due to fading. A good
estimator that allows to reduce fading effect under these assumptions is derived by averaging in
the linear domain according to:
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where Pji(n) are the individual log-domain power measures and m is the number of independent
measures.
To evaluate the gain of doing this averaging, let us have a look at the distribution of the
variable Fji. It is exponentially distributed in the linear domain: as X := 10F/10 is a power we
have
X ∼ exp(−x). (9)
Then, the log-fading follows :
F ∼ c · exp(cf − ecf ), (10)
with c = log(10)/10.
When multiple measures Xji(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ m, are obtained with the same shadowing and











· x̄m−1 exp(−mx̄). (12)






cmf̄ −m · ecf̄
)
. (13)
The corresponding distributions are shown in Fig.2. The asymmetry of the distribution for small
Figure 2: The fading distribution as a function of the number of measures is represented. For
m = 1 the distribution is strongly asymmetric and presents deep fading which affect the risk
estimation probability.
m is clearly visible, as well as the large spreading of the distribution. The standard deviation
for different values of m is summarized in Table 2.
The impact of the fading does not exceed roughly 1dB in terms of standard deviation when
at least 8 values are used for the averaged RSSI, which is made feasible, at a rate Rb = 0.25Hz
and an averaging over 2min slots. It is worth mentioning that this correction is valid only in a
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m 1 2 3 4 5 8 16 32
std σfad (in dB) 5, 6 3, 5 2, 7 2, 3 2 1.6 1.1 0.78
Table 2: Standard deviation (std) related to fading after averaging over m values.
relatively static scenario. Luckily, this is precisely the most relevant scenario for the considered
application.
Consequently, we consider that if the number of RSSI measurements is less than 5, the
confidence in the resulting averaged RSSI (and therefore in the subsequent risk score) will be
low, and should be accounted for in the algorithm. For this reason, specific corrections have been
introduced in Table 5 for cases where m < 5.
These results provide a justification for the parameters used in the procedure Compute_mean_RSSI(),
described in Section 2. In particular, using windows of 2min with an overlap of 1min, provides
a means of obtaining an averaged RSSI, each minute, with a sufficiently low variance.
3.3 Impact of Shadowing
Once this fading compensation has been applied, any known correction gains Gtx or Grx (see
Section 2) should be applied to replace the averaged RSSI measure P̂ji (see (8)) by a compensated
version. Indeed, when no compensation is applied here, then additional uncertainties increase the
shadowing effect. For instance, it has been observed that the static gains G0,tx and G0,rx may
be as large as ±20dB. As such, if these gains are not known, they can increase the shadowing
offset by more than 10dB.
If it is possible to detect specific postures of the device (phone in hand vs phone in the
pocket) or to estimate characteristics of its environment (crowded area, ...), this information may
contribute to better predict the shadowing offset as described now, and therefore to eventually
improve the estimation of the risk score. These posture / environment dependent compensations
take place in the Gain_compensate() procedure, which we now describe.
Assume that the fading has been removed (or the remaining effect is included in shadowing),
and known static gains have been applied.
Denoting P0(dmax) := PE +L0−L(dmax) the theoretical ideally compensated received power
at distance dmax (compare with (5)), we then have a compensated and averaged RSSI measure
given by (cf (7)):
Q̂jId(t) = P0(dmax)− Lr(dji) + S̃ji(t), (14)
where now S̃ji(t) = (GE +Gtx) + (GR +Grx) + Sji(t) + F̃ji(t) accounts for both the shadowing
effect Sji(t) and residual errors in compensating the emission/reception gains and the fading
offset. This compensated and averaged RSSI, Q̂jId(t), is computed each minute during time
slots of 15min, for the temporary Id Id of transmitter i. The remaining shadowing S̃ji(t) is a
random variable which is known to follow a normal distribution N (0, σSh). Without shadowing
we would have a direct relation between the Q̂jId and the distance dji. Unfortunately the
shadowing introduces strong perturbations in this relation and has to be carefully considered.
The impact of this shadowing is studied in Section 4 and is accounted for in two ways :
1. Compensation : the averaging function used over each slot allows to compensate the shad-
owing if some variations occur during the 15min slots. This is likely to appear, in crowded
Inria
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environments and when people are moving around the devices involved in a contact. How-
ever, in some configuration (long meetings in a room, with fixed situations), the shadowing
may remain strong for a long time.
2. Risk scoring : the uncertainty about the power level is included in the model to take into
account the shadowing distribution. The risk is weighted according to the confidence we
have on the measures, in order to minmize the error probability on the risk at the end.
3.4 Description of the Dataset
To parameterize the model, we used the dataset described in [3]. All individuals involved in the
experiment we used for this evaluation hold their phones in their hands. All devices used in these
experiments are SAMSUNG SM-A405SFN. Because the final values of the compensation gains
are not yet publicly available, we work in the rest of this document, with the raw RSSI values.
An example of a trace is provided in Fig.3, corresponding to Room1.
Figure 3: These plots illustrate the variability of the raw RSSI values since they corresponds to
successive slots, with two soldiers positioned at the same places, marked on the ground. In this
example, the inter-body distance is 50cm. Fading is characterized by the fast RSSI variations
(along a slot) while shadowing is illustrated by the difference in average power between the
different slots.
As shown in this Figure, the variability of the RSSI is large. Typically, the average signal
strength observed in slot 3 is much lower with no evident justification. A rough analysis of the
traces gives an idea of the difficulty to predict a distance or a contamination risk from these
measures. But, as suggested in [7], the true question is to evaluate the achievable tradeoff
between false positive and true positive decisions.
Possible reasons for significantly lower RSSI in some scenarios include:
• Uneven behavior of the phones. Further analyses by comparing the traces over time may
help to see if there is a correlation with the phone Id.
• Unlucky fading situation which creates an attenuation by self-interference. Yet, since fading
variations are clearly seen, this is probably not the case.
• A shadowing occurs (the phone is handled in the other hand or is masked by the owner).
Note that in the scenario there are no other people between the devices.
• The overall environment changes. It is worth noting that during slots 3 and 4, the envi-
ronment is more crowded.
RR n° 9345
14 Gorce & Egan & Gribonval
In addition, in this dataset, we see that the RSSI trace from transmissions between location
10 and location 9 in Room 1 is absent for some technical reason. For the other traces, we can
observe that the symmetry of the links is quite good. It means that using the reverse pathloss
link should not bring too much information to stabilize the estimates.
Interestingly, to give an idea of the variability of the RSSI measures with the distance we give
in Fig 15 (in the appendix) the raw RSSI data received by receiver 2 from transmitter 1. They
both enter the playground at slot 1, they move simultaneously according to the two different paths
described in [3]. The distance between them is successively [50cm, 200cm, 403cm, 180cm, 364cm].
In this scenario, slot 1 presents a high risk, slots 2 and 4 are moderately critical and slots 3 and
5 are not risky.
A further illustration of the main problem we have to deal with is in room 4, during slot
1. The distance is only 50cm but the RSSI is much lower than the RSSI measured during the
following sets. An important message highlighted in these traces is the necessity to compensate
for fading first and then to track shadowing variations and to compute a risk estimate accounting
for uncertainties in the RSSI measurements.
3.5 Pathloss models, mean power evaluation and fading compensation
The objective of this section is to evaluate the model parameters from real data.
The mandatory parameters are the received RSSI (P (dmax = 5m)), the attenuation slope (n)
and the shadowing strength.
We use the whole dataset, acquired in 5 different rooms (3 indoor, 2 outdoor). We extracted
the theoretical ground truth distances for all traces and we compare the curves providing the
mean RSSI as a function of distance (see Fig.4).
The estimation of the average distance obtained with three estimators is provided : classical
average power (red), average power in the linear domain (magenta, according to Eq.(8)) or by
averaging over the 25% highest values (blue).
The optimal one is the one that presents the highest ratio between the pathloss variation with
distance and the standard deviation. This occurs for the linear domain average, and justifies the
use of Eq.(8) to reduce fading.
Figure 4: Average received power as a function of the distance for three estimators (mean power,
linear domain mean power, and mean of the 25% largest values.
From these data we can determine an average pathloss model given by P (dmax = 5m) =
−80dBm, n = 1.7 and σSh = 5dB.
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The slope has been chosen to fit the measurements in the range [1m, 4m] which is the most
important part to discriminate the risk. Of course, this model has been built with a specific phone
model. For future exploitation, the calibrated value of P0(dmax) should be computed by adding
the compensation factors. Interestingly, Fig.5 shows the power distribution for three classes
Figure 5: Histogram of the averaged raw RSSI values over dataset1, for three distance classes
(C1 : d < 175cm,C2 : 175cm < d < 300cm,C3 : 300cm < d < 450cm)
of pairwise devices, based on the ground-truth distance, which is known in the experimental
dataset.
Clearly the overlap between the different classes is important. Let us emphasize that in this
model the fading was carefully compensated by an averaging process over 10min traces. The
estimation of the fading strength parameter m (used to define the linear domain averaging (8)
for m = 1) exhibits an interesting right shift with distance. However, its variability is too high
to make it relevant for classification.
The main parameters and notations used in this section and the next one are summarized in
Table 3.
Name Role Nominal value
dc Critical distance for risk evaluation 2m
dmax Reference distance for pathloss 5m
P ∗(dmax) Non calibrated reference RSSI at dmax −80dBm
σ∗Sh Shadowing strength 4dB
n∗ Pathloss slope coefficient 1.7
Table 3: List of parameters used in the propagation model and the risk model. The parameters
with the symbol .∗ are those for which the nominal values have been estimated from the PEPP-
PT dataset. They are used to compute the parameters P ∗min and ∆P used in the algorithm.
Note that at the time of this study, the calibration gains were not known and all the parameters
have been computed without compensation for static gains. To be reused with other dataset,
these parameters should be compensated with the GSMA gain factors. .
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4 Distance-RSSI relation in a Bayesian formalism
In light of the model (14), we now develop a Bayesian model of the conditional probability
distribution of the distance given the observed (calibrated) RSSI values.
4.1 Mathematical notations
We adopt the following notations: x, x, X respectively denote deterministic scalar, vector and
matrix quantities and X, x, X respectively denote random scalar, vector and matrix variables.
Moreover, we denote by (·)∗, (·)T and (·)H, the conjugate, transpose and conjugate transpose
operations respectively.
4.2 Bayesian formalism
We denote d the distance between a pair of devices. In this section the objective is to establish
a Bayesian model characterizing the relation between d and the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
RSSI measurements gathered from HELLO packets.
Consider the scenario where mobile i acts at the transmitter (Tx) and j as the receiver (Rx).
Of course, the process is in practice bi-directional, but we consider estimating the risk from the
point of view of a receiver, without any feedback from j to i. While the symmetry of the links
could be used to strengthen the estimation but such approach would need additional information
in the HELLO packets.
As mentioned in the former section, the raw RSSI measurements evaluated from one receiver
are subject to various effects, including fading, shadowing, and receiver noise. Receiver noise and
fading are short term effects and can be significantly reduced with local averaging, as already
presented in section 3.3. Therefore, in the rest of this section, we assume that an estimation of the
average RSSI has been done, after the application of all known compensations. The remaining
RSSI vector is still affected by a shadowing effect. The received RSSI is given by (14) and (6)
hence, given the two devices i and j communicating at a given distance d, the pathloss (PL)
between both devices, assumed to be symmetric, is a random variable given by:
Q̂ = P0(dmax)− a log(d/dmax) + S, (15)
where P0(dmax), dmax, a are the model parameters (given in the former section), and S is a random
variable which stands for shadowing and other effects related to the environment. Parameter
P0(dmax) is the theoretical compensated average power observed when d = dmax, and parameter
a is related to the pathloss slope parameter n in (6) by a := 10log(10)n. As we have seen in section
3, the measurements done by the Bundeswehr [2, 3] in the PEPP-PT project give credit to such
a model.
Consider now the distance-RSSI problem reformulated for the scenario of interest. From
a given signal duration acquired within one 15-minute time slot, a compensated average RSSI
is provided according to the algorithm described above and leads to Q̂. It is further assumed
that the measures are made for a distance in the range d ∈ [0; dmax], at most. For the sake of
simplicity and without loss of generality, this maximum distance is set to the reference distance
dmax in the model (15). In the experimental part, we will use dmax = 5m.
Let be define the gap Γ between the theoretical compensated average received power P0(dmax)
and the measured value as
Γ = Q̂− P0(dmax). (16)
Clearly if the ground truth distance is d = dmax, Γ = −S. Otherwise,
Γ = −a log(d/dmax)− S. (17)
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Now, the problem can be clearly identified as an estimation problem in a noisy channel.
In order to estimate a contamination risk, which is assumed to be directly related to the
distance d and the duration of the contact, we propose to exploit a Bayesian formulation of the
problem. For the moment, we consider a static distance to be computed from Γ.





where PD(d) is the prior knowledge on d, pΓ(γ) is the marginal of Γ and pΓ|D(γ|d) is its likelihood
given d. In the StopCovid problem we are interested in the posterior distribution pD|Γ(d|γ)
since it provides a basis to construct risk scores. For example, given an observation γ, the
conditional probability density function (pdf) of the distance can be used to evaluate the CDF
F (dc|γ) = P (d ≤ dc|Γ). Here, dc is the maximal distance at which the virus can be transmitted.
We note that epidemiologist have evaluated a typical maximal distance to be dc = 2m, but this
can be extended to dc = 10m when the persons holding the devices are cycling.
We will discuss the transformation of this posterior probability into a risk score in next
section. We however anticipate that such risk measure should answer the question: Given an
observed average RSSI, what is the probability that d ≤ dc ?
4.3 Prior information
The Prior probability represents the prior knowledge about the distance d. We will essentially
work with a probabilistic model assumes that the devices are located uniformly at random over
the area. That is, for a pair of devices i, j, fix the position of device i and then consider that
device j is located uniformly at random in the disc of radius dmax, the maximal distance we are
concerned with. Therefore, if device j is randomly positioned in this disc, the pdf of the distance
is :




As we will see later, it may be more convenient to work with a logarithmic distance that we
define as
Z := − log(D/dmax). (20)
The pdf of this inverse log distance is thus given by:
pZ;dmax(z) = 2 · e−2z, (21)
where z ∈ [0;∞). Note the correspondence d = dmax → z = 0 and d = 0→ z =∞.
Remark. This basic model will be used as the reference model, but it does not take into account
any social effect and considers a pure uniform random distribution of the device’s holders. This
may overestimate the prior probability of small distances. Social models could suggest to introduce
repulsive effects with a distance law such as :
pD(d) = 1− e−αd
2
, (22)
where α is a parameter of the model. This is not pursued further in this document
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4.4 Likelihood function
Consider the likelihood of the gap Γ, cf (17), conditional to the “log-distance” Z, cf (20), namely
pΓ|Z(γ|z). From the model given in (17), we have:
Γ = a · Z− S. (23)
From this equation it follows that the likelihood pΓ|Z(γ|z) is determined by the pdf of S.
It is commonly admitted that this shadowing variable follows a normal distribution in many
radio environments, and this seems to be partially confirmed by the experimental data provided
by the BLE-RSSI in PEPP-PT [1, 2, 3].









where a is the pathloss coefficient already defined, and σ2Sh is the shadowing variance. The value
of these coefficients can be tuned to fit with experimental data. In Section 3, we found n = 1.7
and σSh = 5dB and we recall that a = 10n/ log(10).
4.5 Posterior distribution





Injecting the derivations above, one obtains:
pZ|Γ(z|γ) = K0(γ) · exp
−
(

















is a normalization constant. Note that
even if this posterior distribution looks to be normally distributed, this is not exactly the case
since in the model z is restricted to the half-line [0; +∞). This is therefore a truncated normal
distribution, where K0(γ) ensures the normalization of the probability density function. The
normalization constant can be either computed numerically or from the marginal, likelihood and
prior pdfs. However, in some cases, we may not need to compute it explicitly.
4.6 Estimation metrics
From this posterior distribution, different estimators of the log-distance can be derived:





This estimator does not take into account the prior information.
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Compared to the ML estimator, this estimator takes into account the prior distribution.
When γ is smaller than the threshold 2σ2Sh/a
2 the estimate of the log-distance corresponds
to a distance d̂ = dmax.
3. The MMSE (minimum mean square error) is given by
ẑMMSE = EZ|Γ(z),
i.e. the average of the posterior distribution. If the truncation of the normal distribution
is neglected, then this estimator is equal to the MAP, otherwise, the average value needs
to be computed.
For the purpose of computing the infectiousness risk, the posterior distribution of the risk is
more powerful and may help to do classification more efficiently. Typically, an hypothesis test
can be conducted (from a Bayesian or a Neyman-Pearson test), allowing to adapt efficiently the
balance between false alarm (FA) and misdetection (MD) rates.
4.7 Simulation results
Using the parameters obtained in Sec.3, i.e. with P (dmax) = −80dBm and n = 1.7, the Bayesian
model is used, with a maximal coverage range equal to 5m. Figure 6 below plots the cdf of the
distance probability as a function of a given raw RSSI measure for three different shadowing
values
Figure 6: CDF pD|RSSI(d|rssi) for different raw RSSI values (not compensated by the static
gains) and for three values of σSh, (4dB, 5dB, 10dB).
On Fig 6, the probability that the ground truth distance is below some value for a given
averaged raw RSSI, is estimated. We see that even a small variation in σSh has a strong impact on
the accuracy of the risk prediction. On the left figure with σSh = 4dB, a raw RSSI = −64dBm
allows to ensure that Pr(d < 2m|RSSI) = 0.9. But on the center, with σSh = 5dB, the
probability reduces to Pr(d < 2m|RSSI) = 0.7. On the right, with σSh = 10dB, this probability
reduces to 45%.
This is why a good calibration is necessary. Therefore, many efforts should be done to reduce
this variability with contextual and posture compensations.
Of course, the value of the threshold relies on the model, and especially on the standard
deviation of the shadowing, as illustrated in Fig.7.
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Clearly, when the standard deviation of the shadowing is given by σSh = 4dB, the accuracy
of the distance’s measure increases very significantly while a value of σSh = 10dB contains only
very few information (at 10dB, it seems not reasonable to compute a proximity measure, and
this is the level of shadowing we can expect if the prediction is based on single RSSI values).
The flatness of the curve at σSh = 10dB shows the poor selectivity of the RSSI information.
Figure 7: Cumulated distributed function (cdf) of the conditional probability F (d ≤ 2m|rssi)
when the rssi is the compensated and averaged RSSI, as a function of the shadowing strength.
5 Infectiousness model: risk evaluation
The infectiousness model aims at computing an infection risk from a contact, defined by an
exposition duration and a distance. To the best of our knowledge, such a model does not exist.
From the state-of-the-art literature, a high risk can be assumed when someone is exposed to an
infected person at a distance of 2 meters or less for a duration of 15 minutes or more. Of course
this risk depends on many factors : are the people face to face ? are they following safety rules
(mask, etc...)? As such information is not available we consider a risk averaged on the (unknown)
distribution of these hidden latent factors.
Let start by some general considerations and reminders on the main properties of the ROBERT
protocol. At a given time, each user X has a random infection state ISX ∈ {I, Ī}, where I means
infected, and Ī means not infected. When two users A and B get sufficiently close for their
mobiles to establish a BLE connection, the system uses BLE RRSI measurements to register a
(pseudonymized) contact between them, and an objective is to compute a risk of contamination.
After few days, if patient B is declared infected, the system has to determine the probability
that patient A is infected given the assumption that B was infected when the contact occurred:
P (ISA = I|ISB = I; cAB) (27)
where cAB gathers characteristics of the contact, such as its duration and aggregated information
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about the distance between A and B during this contact. We investigate a model of how the
risk probability scales with time and distance.
5.1 Additivity of the risk with respect to time
Fortunately, the time dependence of the risk can be determined by considering simple probability
rules. Denote c = cAB for short and let q be the conditional safety probability for patient A:
q = P
(
ISA = Ī|ISB = I; c
)
. (28)
Then, assume that patients A and B have been in contact two times, according to contact
characteristics c1 and c2. By a natural consideration, we assume that A is safe only if he/she is
kept safe after each contact. Assuming statistical independence, this yields
P
(
ISA = Ī|ISB = I; c1, c2
)
= q1 · q2. (29)
Clearly the overall safety is the product of by-contact safety variables. Given that q is a proba-
bility, define a risk level as:
r = − log(q), (30)
where r is variable defined on R+. By definition, the probability of being infected is related to
the risk r(c) by:
P (ISA = I|ISB = I; c) = 1− e−r(c). (31)
Then, we arrive to the first important property of successive exposure
Proposition 1 (Risk additivity). When a patient A is exposed to patient B at the occasion of
two contacts c1 and c2, the risk function r is additive
r(c1, c2) = r(c1) + r(c2).
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of the risk function and the fact that the safety
probability is the product of by-contact safety probabilities (assuming statistical independence).






The probability of being infected during a contact is obviously a function of the distance d
between users A and B and of the duration t of their contact. If c is now defined by a continuous





where R is a monotonic decreasing function of distance, to be modeled.
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A “ground truth” summary of the contacts between users A and B if therefore cAB =
{(∆ti, di)}Ni=1 and allow to compute the conditional probability of infection once we will have
the function R(.).
To summarize, while the dependency of the risk with respect to time is linear by property of
the safety probability, its dependency with respect to the distance d remains unknown.
5.2 Possible models of the instantaneous risk as a function of distance
As we know that the distance measure from RSSI vectors is very uncertain, the simplest model
is almost surely the best one to use in the StopCovid context.
Possible functions as suggested in [4] to model the risk as a function of distance are:
1. Heaviside RH(d) = r0; d ≤ dc
0 otherwise
2. Piecewise linear RL(d) = r0; d ≤ dc
r0
d0−x
d0−dc dc < d < d0
0 otherwise




where dc is a critical distance and r0 is parameter characterizing the overall risk level, to be
determined by experts in epidemiology. To the best of our knowledge, a reasonable choice could
be dc = 2m in a static or walking situation, while dc = 10m could be more appropriate for people
cycling. Therefore for a given ground truth trajectory d(t), t ∈ [0, T ] one obtains the following
risk measures, where P (·) and E [·] should be interpreted as the integrals corresponding to the
"probability" and "expectation" over the values taken in the considered time interval (with a
uniform distribution):
1. Heaviside function : with RH(·), the risk associated to a trajectory d(t) is
rH(c) = r0 · T · P (d ≤ dc) . (36)
2. Piecewise linear function : with RL(·), the risk is now
rL(c) = r0 · T ·
(
P (d ≤ dc) + E
[





3. Exponential function : with RE(·), the risk is now
rE(c) = r0 · T ·
(






Note that for a constant ground truth distance d(t) = d, we get :
rH(c) = r0 · T · 1{d≤dc}
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5.3 Expectation of the risk – notion of score
In practice, the ground truth distance trajectory is not directly accessible but only estimated
from RSSI measurements, hence the corresponding risk is not directly accessible either. It can at
best be estimated from concrete contact information, denoted c̃AB , that contains (averaged and
compensated) RSSI-based measures, e.g. the vector of corrected RSSI values Q̂jId defined in the
former sections (with j the index of the mobile of patient B and Id the temporary Id of that of
patient A) or sequences γi of gaps (see (16)) between such measures and a reference RSSI. .
The score is a quantity useful to assess the risk level once multiplied by r0: it is defined as
π(γ) := P (D ≤ dc | γ) . (40)
From now on, we rely on the Heaviside risk model rH(·): given the intrinsic uncertainty in
estimating γ itself, and the averaging over this uncertainty provided by the following approach,
it seems superfluous to use a more sophisticated parametric risk model. With this model, the
expected risk as well as its variance are simple functions of the score:
E [RH(D) | γ] = r0π(γ)
Var [RH(D) | γ] = r20π(γ)(1− π(γ))
As illustrated on Figure 8, this allows to quantify uncertainties on the actual value of the risk
given an observed value of γ. In the future, it could be envisioned to exploit these to handle
false-positive /false-negative tradeoffs.














Figure 8: The plot represents π(γ) ±
√
π(γ)(1− π(γ)) for a = 5, dmax = 10m, dc = 1.8m and
σ = 7dB, using the particular expression of π(γ) from (9).





we obtain estimates of the risk and its variance
E [rH(c) | c̃AB ] = r0π(c̃AB) (42)
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Remark. Importantly, this shows that we only need to be able to compute a score π(γ) (or more
generally π(c̃) on the mobile, as the absolute risk level r0 can be tuned at the server layer as needed
for epidemiology purposes, or to control tradeoffs between false positives and false negatives.
Proposition 2. With the distance model previously developed we get an analytic expression of



















































π(γ) = P (D ≤ dc | γ) = P
(
dmaxe
−Z ≤ dc | γ
)

















































5.4 Improved estimates using side information





















Figure 9: The plots represent π(γ) for a = 5, dmax = 10m, dc = 1.8m and σSh ∈ {4, 7, 10}dB.
If side information is available, it can improve the estimate of the risk (or more precisely of
the score), either by providing a better prior for the distance model, or a more accurate estimate
of the shadowing variance σSh, or a better calibration of the pathloss model. Some examples
include:
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• if the user is cycling, set dc = 10m, otherwise dc = 1.8m;
• if the phone is in the pocket (or using some other side information), shadowing is more
likely hence set σSh = 10dB
• if the number of mobiles around is high, the probability of a short distance d is increased so
we may want to change the prior on Z to increase the probability of a large “log-distance”.
A heuristic version would be p(z) = ce−cz with c < 2 (to increase the heaviness of the tails
compared to the model with c = 2 considered so far), leading to a modified posterior for Z
compared to (26):
pZ|Γ(z|γ, c) = Kc(γ) · exp
−
(


























This is illustrated on Figure 9 where π(γ) is displayed for an average value of a, dmax = 10m,
dc = 1.8m and various values of σSh, c ∈ {1, 2}. The value c = 1 is arbitrary for illustration
purposes.
6 A practical risk assessment
In order to build a computationally efficient model, we propose to exploit the former model to
calculate a risk associated to a 15-minute time slot. Considering the reference critical contact
c∗ = {∆t = 15min, d = 2m}, an expert should answer two related questions
1. If someone is exposed for 15min at 2m from an infected person, what is his/her probability
of being infected ?
2. What probability of being infected should be reported as high risk to a user of the appli-
cation ?
Answers to these questions can help determine a value ε∗ such that:
P (ISA = I|ISB = I; cAB = c∗) = 1− ε∗. (48)
Combined with (31), (34), and (35), this should enable tuning r0, which gives direct relations
between the expected risk and computable scores π.
Remark. We insist again on the fact that r0 is not needed at the application layer to compute
the score πjId. The parameters ε∗ or r0 are only mandatory if we want to relate the score to a
concrete probability of infection using (42) and (31).
At the moment, let us suggest the following numbers, for illustration purposes. We consider
that one exposition of 15min to a face to face contact at less than 2m induces a probability of
contamination of 10%. We also assume that a global probability of being infected above 20%
should be reported to the device’s owner.
According to these assumptions, the following parameters are proposed:
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parameter Critical Critical Ref. exposure Ref. exposure risk coeff.
infec. prob. safety prob. time distance
variable Pr∗I ε
∗ ∆ t dc r0
value 10% 0.9 15min 2m 0.007min−1
Table 4: Values of the main parameters used to translate scores into concrete risks and proba-
bilities of contamination.
We now turn to the estimation of the probability of contamination in three steps : computing
a score πjId associated to one contact measure (Q̂jId(n)), then computing an cumulative score
associated to a time slot, and finally aggregating the probability of contamination over the day
for one receiver.
6.0.1 Score for one contact measure
Let us start with the score πjId. Due to the complexity of the model, we propose to use the risk
model based on the Heaviside function rH(·) given in (35). Now, exploiting the score expressed




















The value of the parameters to be used in this expression have been obtained from the
PEPP-PT dataset in section 3 and are:
• dmax = 5m. Maximal distance used in the model
• a = 10n/ log(10) = 7.38 (according to the pathloss model found in experimental data with
n = 1.7).
• γ(n) = Q̂jId(n) − P ∗(dmax) = −80dBm, estimated from the non calibrated experimental
data.
• σSh+fad(n) is the standard deviation due to shadowing and remaining fading, with σSh =
4dB, according to the experimental results and the additional fading term is given in
Table 2.
Note that the parameters PL, a and σSh = 5dB are the unique parameters to be determined. Tun-
ing these parameters as a function of the environment (crowded/not crowded, indoor/outdoor,...)
could improve any algorithm, but this needs to be evaluated from extensive measurement cam-
paigns.
The function (49) is quite complex to evaluate analytically on a mobile device due to the
evaluation of the erfc function. Yet, as illustrated on Figure 9, its shape is relatively basic,
hence we propose a piecewise linear approximation of this function according to:
π̂(γ) := max(0,min(1, α(γ − γmin))) (50)
where the slope α and the reference value γmin can be adapted to the parameters appearing
in (49).
In practice, these piecewise linear approximations are determined by fitting the value and
slope at the point γ where π(γ) = 0.5.
Inria
Estimating Covid-19 infectiousness risk from Bluetooth measurements 27
For the sake of computational efficiency, we can develop piecewise approximations, where a
linear piecewise function is proposed for each value of σSh+fad = σSh + σfad (see Table 2) for
values of σfad. The corresponding functions are represented in Fig.10 for the different standard
deviations. The dashed curve represents the piecewise linear models.










where P ∗min and ∆P are obtained from the curves and thus rely on experimental measurements
on which the model is computed.
Note that introducing the calibration gains would simply shift these curves on the x-axis.
Figure 10: The curves represent the score π as a function of the non calibrated averaged RSSI for
the different fading plus shadowing strength values given in Table 5. The dashed lines represent
the simplified piecewise model that fits the curve at π = 0.5 and allow to determine the values
of Pmin and ∆P in section 2.
We see that in these simulations, that the piecewise linear model is defined by two extreme
values Pmin and Pmax. We can note that the minimal significant power Pmin is almost constant
for all curves, around −75dBm. Clearly, this means that an average power lower than −75dBm
can be interpreted as a non-exposure situation with a high probability. On the opposite the
other limit Pmax is very sensitive to the shadowing strength. The power range is defined as the
difference between these two extreme values
∆P = Pmax − Pmin.
Table 5 summarizes the parameters of the model.
6.0.2 Cumulative score for one 15min time slot
Now, the next question is to compute a score associated to a 15min slot.
RR n° 9345
28 Gorce & Egan & Gribonval
number of measures Np(n) 1 2 3 4 5 > 5
additional standard deviation S(n) (in dB) 5, 6 3, 5 2, 7 2, 3 2 1
total standard deviation σSh+f (n) (in dB) 9, 6 7, 5 6, 7 6, 3 6 5
Minimal power Pmin (in dBm) −75 −75 −75 −75 −75 −75
Max Limit power PL (in dBm) −36 −48 −52 −54 −55 −60
Diff power ∆P (in dB) 39 27 23 21 20 15
Table 5: Additional standard deviations due to fading, as a function of the number of measures
per 2min. This standard deviation adds to the shadowing standard deviation, estimated at 4dB.





This cumulative score will give a number between 0 and 15. Typically, we suggest that a cumula-
tive score less than 3 could be discarded, and a cumulative score higher than 7 would correspond
to a strong risk. This metric has been proposed for the first version of the application.
Alternative approach However, to keep track of the exposure duration and intensity, we







and to build a vector of contact parameters, given by
ΘjId = {π̄jId, DjId, NjId} , (54)
where DjId is the duration of the contact (difference between the indices of the first and the last
non null coefficients) and NjId is the number of non null scores. Since N = 15 is known this is a
strictly richer information as we can recover Nπ̄jId = πjId.
A last optimization relies on the average computation. Considering channel properties, we
believe that strong values of risks are more important, because they reveal almost surely an
existing contact. Therefore, we suggest to use a softmax based average according to









where b is a parameter to be tuned. A value b = 0.1 gives good results and allows to reasonably
differentiate high and low risk coefficient values.
6.0.3 Computing the probability of contamination
Now let us turn to the computation of a probability of contamination of a given user i, computed
at the server side. The general principle is as follows
• each receiver device i whose owner has been tested positive is storing a list of temporary
Ids which have been identified to be potentially infected, as their cumulative scores πiId
exceed the threshold prescribed by the server. Such Ids, are then sent by such devices j to
the server.
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• on a regular basis, user j queries the server to evaluate its contamination risk by combining
all computed risks. The server can retrieve a vector of the corresponding scores Π(j) :=
(π`)
L
`=1 (or possibly an array of enriched scores Θ(j) = {(π̄`, D`, N`)}L`=1). Each (enriched)
score comes as a plain value, with no information on the device j which computed it.
Basic approach Let first consider the case where the cumulative score has been computed
according to (45). Then according to (31) and using the same arguments leading to the additivity
of the risk, the total probability of contamination of user j is








Note that since ∆T = 1min it does not appear in the above expression.
Let us illustrate with few examples :
1. Case 1 : j has been subject to L = 4 contacts with respective scores π` of 5, 7, 10, 10.
Typically a score of 10 may represents a strong contact lasting 10min or a medium contact
lasting 15min. Then, the probability of being contaminated is
P (ISj = I|Π(j)) = 0.13,
which represents a moderate risk.
2. Case 2 : i has been subject to L = 4 contacts, all with respective scores of 10. Then, the
infectiousness probability is
P (ISj = I|Π(j)) = 0.244,
which represents a strong risk.
3. Case 3 : j has been subject to L = 20 contacts, all with a moderate score of 4. Then, the
infectiousness probability is
P (ISj = I|Π(j)) = 0.43
which represents a strong risk. This risk is not due to a long exposition to a unique person,
but to the multiplicity of the individual risks.
Alternative approach Now let us consider the case where the average score has been returned
with duration and number of contacts. Then the infectiousness probability can be computed
according to








Alternatively, D` can be replaced by N` which better represents the strength of the contact.
Although the result is equivalent to the direct computation of the cumulative score, having
the three parameters π̄`, D` and N` may allow to balance in the future the impact of the three
parameters and to develop a more advanced combination function.
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7 Experimental results of risk assessment on PEPP-PT data
7.1 Experimental setup
Based on the model derived in sections 4 and 5, and calibrated as described in section 3, we
propose to evaluate the model on the data from the German group.
Note that the model has been calibrated from the whole set of data from the German group,
taken as a whole set. There is no specific calibration for each room where the data have been
acquired. 3 rooms are indoor and 2 are outdoor.
The unique parameters required in our model, are the pathloss slope coefficient (n∗ = 1.7)
and the RSSI at 5m, i.e. P ∗(dmax) = −80dBm.
According to the fading model described above, and using the Bayes optimal detector, we
computed the parameters of the piecewise linearized risk scoring function, as indicated in table
5 i.e Pmin = −75dBm and ∆p = 15dB (all trace have been recorded at a fast sampling with
much more than 8 values per window).
In this section, we exploit only the traces obtained when the soldiers were standing in each
position for 10min (long slots), in each of the 5 rooms used in this experiment.
Each dataset includes the traces along 6 slots. Soldiers 1 and 2 entered first the playground,
then 3 and 4, and so on. The soldiers walk around two paths for odd and even numbers.
7.2 Reference risk
In order to evaluate the capability of our algorithm to estimate the infectiousness risk, we first
need to determine a reference risk. For that we use the reference distances between pairs of
soldiers, according to the scenario described in [3].
The reference risk classes are defined between 0 and 5, where 5 represents the class with the
maximal risk. The correspondence between distances and theoretical risk is reported in Table
6. Not that these numbers are here for the purpose of classification, but they do not represent a
Tx-Rx Distance d(m) ≤ 1m ≤ 1.5m ≤ 2m ≤ 2.5m ≤ 3m .
. > 1m > 1.5m > 2m > 2.5m > 3m
Reference risk 5 4 3 2 1 0
(arbitrary)
Table 6: risk classes associated to the different signals.
quantification of the risk. Further, we will not use this classification for the purpose of classifying
all observed signals in these categories. But we use these classes to observe how they are classified
from the received signals. The primary objective is to identify class 4 and class 5 with the highest
probability, with a low false positive rate for the class 5 at least.
In addition, when in the scenarios two soldiers are separated by a third soldier positioned
between the two others, it can be anticipated that the average RSSI will be lowered due to non
line of sight (nLOS) conditions. However, it is also worth noting that the risk associated to these
two soldiers is also reduced. Therefore, the RSSI reduction due to the presence of someone in
the middle is correlated to a risk reduction.
To track this fact, and to avoid too much non detection due to this masking effect, we explored
the data from the German group and identified all pairwise situations where a third soldier was
masking the line of sight. Then the risk class of the corresponding radio link was reduced by
2. For instance, if two soldiers have a risk class 3 when considering their mutual distance, the
presence of a soldier between them reduces this link to class 1.
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7.3 Risk evaluation
We describe herein the procedure for the risk evaluation applied to these data. In the StopCovid
application, a contact C(A → B) is made of a list of HELLO packets received from node A to
node B during a slot, with a maximal duration of 15min. Indeed, each 15min, the terminal Ids
are randomly changed and the receiver cannot track the current Tx.
In the data we are considering here, the duration of the slots was 10min. Therefore, the
contact duration we are looking for is aligned on the experimental slot duration, i.e. 10min.
From each raw trace, the signal corresponding to one slot is extracted and processed as if it was
corresponding to a StopCovid trace of 10min.
The RSSI trace is windowed by a sliding rectangular window of 120sec, positioned each
60sec. For instance, at time t0, the first operation is to get the RSSI values received from t0 to
t0 + 120. From this set, the linear domain mean power is computed according to (8). For each
slot of 10min, we get between 9 and 11 averaged RSSI measurements. The RSSI traces, over 4
consecutive slots of 10mn, as well as the distance and risk estimations are provided in Fig. 11
and Fig. 12
Figure 11: Traces between devices 1 and 2, room 5 from PEPP-PT data. Red lines are ground-
truth values. Note that the scores plotted in (c) are on a scale [0; 2]. The ground-truth score is
2 for a distance lower than 1m and 1 for a distance lower than 2.5m. The estimated score is also
scaled by a factor 2 for consistency.
For each averaged RSSI measurement, the risk is computed with (51), and provides a number
between 0 and 1. According to (52), the score associated to the contact is the average of individual
risks.
Considering one dataset (first data set on April, 9 and for room 5), the results presented in
Fig. 13 have been obtained. On the left, the figure presents the cumulative distribution (CDF)
of the estimated score for a given class. For the class d > 4m, the CDF is represented in the
classical orientation (from left to right). For the other classes, the CCDF is presented, from right
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Figure 12: Traces between devices 1 and 2, room 4 from PEPP-PT data. Note that the scores
plotted in (c) are on a scale [0; 2]. The ground-truth score is 2 for a distance lower than 1m and
1 for a distance lower than 2.5m. The estimated score is also scaled by a factor 2 for consistency.
to left.
According to the proposed algorithm, three scores are defined : high score for π̄ > 7/15,
medium score for 3/15 > π̄ > 3/15 and negligible score if π̄ < 3/15. These limits are represented
in the figure by the vertical black lines. With these values, we obtain the conditional classification
in Table 7. The thresholds can be shifted to balance false positive and true positive rates.
ground truth risk class 0 1− 2 3− 5 4− 5 5
distance d > 3m 2m ≤ d ≤ 3m d < 2m d < 1.3m d < 0.8m
no risk 80% 30% 30% 21% 12%
medium risk 18% 40% 20% 12% 14%
high risk 2% 30% 50% 67% 74%
Table 7: Class detection probabilities under the risk scores identified in Fig. 13.
Note that a unique threshold could be used : risk/no risk, with the objective to discriminate
the class C0 against a subset of the other classes. For instance, a threshold value at 0.35, would
provide a false alarm rate of 5%, while the non detection probability for the class C5 would be
only of 12%. If the critical distance to be considered is 2m, then the non detection probability
would approach 35% with this threshold. If the 2m distance is the most critical, we may move
the threshold to 0.1, providing a false alarm rate of 30% and a non detection probability of 20%
for the distance class of 2m.
The take away message is that it is possible to detect 80% of contacts at less than 2m and
90% of contacts at less than 1m at the price of false alarms at a rate of 30% (with a threshold
at 1m).
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The choice of the threshold may depend on the ratio between the packet received from class
c0 compared to the positive class. Let consider the case of a critical distance at 2m. If the
number of packets is equivalent in both classes, then one packet classified in the class risk has
a probability of 3/4 to be a true positive and 1/4 to be a false positive. Then if one packet is
classified in the class no risk, it has also a probability of 3/4 to be a true negative and 1/4 to be
a false negative.
But if the number of packets in class c0 is twice the number of packet in the positive class,
then, one packet classified in the class risk has a probability of 0.57 to be a true positive and
0.43 to be a false positive. Then if one packet is classified in the class no risk, it has a probability
of 87% to be a true negative and only 13% to be a false negative.
These examples are just here to remind that the knowledge of a prior information about the
distribution of packets may be useful to tune the thresholds to be applied in the risk function. If
it is anticipated that the prior probability of class 0 packets is higher, then the thresholds should
be shifted to the right.
This is why it seems more constructive to track the score (the number between 0 and 1) and
to work on these numbers at the server side. We indeed believe that such application may be
efficient to determine an average risk over days than granting the detection of one event.
Figure 13: Distribution of risk estimation as a function of the ground truth risk class (based on
distance).
7.3.1 Impact of the average computation method
In the former result, we applied a classical mean on the scores computed for each minute. How-
ever, it appears in the data that some risk scores are more significant than others. Especially,
when a high score is measured, then the probability of a contact is much more likely, while when
a low score is obtained, the probability of a false negative is higher. Therefore we propose the
use of the weighted softmax score according to (55).
The improvement induced by this estimator is illustrated in Fig.14. While the class C0 curve
remains comparable, the other curves shift to the right characterizing an improvement in the
false positive-misdetection tradeoff. Remarkably, we can see that at a threshold π = 0.45, the
false positive rate remains equivalent while the detection probability grows up to 90% for class
C1.
We therefore applied the same model, with the same parameters to the 4 other rooms in the
dataset. The results are at as good for rooms 1, 3, 4 but are less convincing in room 2. In this
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Figure 14: Distribution of score estimation as a function of the ground truth score class (based
on distance), with the weighted softmax (55).
room, the analysis of the data exhibits a received power that is 10dB lower than in the other, in
average.
8 Conclusion
This document has been written to formalize a method for the infectiousness risk computation
from BLE RSSI values, relying extensively on the work done in the StopCovid consortium and on
the results produced by the PEPP-PT project. Our objective was to propose a robust algorithm
to compute an infectiousness probability, from BLE measurements and to make it compatible
with the ROBERT protocol.
We wrote this report to make it accessible by people interested to understand the parameters
used in StopCovid. We also provide theoretical elements to justify the model. We keep the model
as simple as possible to avoid over-fitting on the dataset and to make it as flexible as possible.
There is no revolution in the model. Many parts of the algorithm were proposed in the
PEPP-PT group. The difference with the algorithm proposed by the German group, is that in
our approach we took care of physical phenomena (fading, shadowing) to derive estimation rules
rather than using a machine learning approach. We believe that it is a good way to produce a
reference model, generalisable to other setup.
It is worth that this preliminary report exploits a lot the PEPP-PT dataset and we thank
the authors of these works for sharing their data, thoughts and models. The next report will
show how this model can be applied to other dataset, especially those that have been obtained
on the dataset acquired by the StopCovid consortium. These data are really complementary to
the data from the German group, and will provide a better understanding of the performance of
our algorithms in various situations. As the algorithm is rather flexible and has few parameters
to tune, the algorithm will be updated according to the observation of these data.
A Raw traces
The traces given in Fig.15 are example of the trace acquired in the 4mn-rounds as described in
[3]. The raw RSSI values are represented a a function of time. These traces have been acquired
with an average rate of 1 packet each two seconds. Therefore, for a window of 2mn, we can
expect to get in average 60 measures. We observed a limited precision loss if the number of
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samples is reduced down to 16 points, meaning that a rate of 1 HELLO packet each 8 seconds
could be reasonably sufficient to compute a reliable average power. The use of the linear domain
average (according to Eq.(8)) allows to significantly reduce the fading effect, and the dominant
effect is the shadowing.
Because the scenarios generated in this experimentation are relatively static, a static shad-
owing may appear and lasts a whole slot. This fact makes this dataset challenging, since for
some situations, we may have a strong shadowing, and thus a low signal even for two soldiers
standing less than one meter to each other.
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Figure 15: RSSI traces received by Rx2 from Tx1 during the 4mn scenario, i.e. where the
soldiers stand in each position for 4mn. The reference curves are the theoretical average RSSI
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